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EX PARTE QUIRIN ET AL - THE NAZI
SABOTEUR CASE
ROBERT

E.

CUSHMAN

On October 29, 1942, the United States Supreme Court filed its longawaited opinion in the case of the Nazi saboteurs. The Court decided in a
brief per curiam opinion on July 31 that the saboteurs could constitutionally
be tried by a military commission, and that the commission was properly
set up and had followed correct procedure. The military trial was promptly
completed and on August 8 the President announced that six of the saboteurs
had been executed and two imprisoned. We now learn from the able opinion
of Chief Justice Stone the Court's reasons for handling as it did one of the
most dramatic incidents in recent Supreme Court history.
The facts in this case were not disputed. By stipulation of counsel the
Court had before it the following story. At four o'clock in the morning of
June 13, 1942, four men, wearing the fatigue uniforms of the German Marine
Infantry, were landed from a German submarine on the beach at Amagansett
near the tip of tong Island, 125 miles east of New York City. They changed
to civilian dress and then buried in the sand their uniforms and a supply of
explosives, incendiaries, fuses, detonators, timing devices, and acids. They
carried with them some $90,000 in American currency and an elaborate list
of American factories, railroad centers, bridges, power plants, water supply
systems; and the like. The four men proceeded to New York City. On June
17 four other men landed under almost identical circumstances at Ponte
Vedra Beach, near Jacksonville, Florida. They buried a similar supply of
explosives, incendiaries, fuses, and timing devices. They went, without being
discovered, to Jacksonville, and from there some went to Chicago.
The eight men all had been born in Germany, all had lived for some time
in the United States, and all had returned to Germany between 1933 and
1941. Six of the men (Quirin, Neubauer, Heinck, Thiel, Kerling, Dasch)
were German citizens. Burger had been naturalized in the United States but
had forfeited his American citizenship by induction into the German Army
in 1941. Haupt claimed American citizenship based on the naturalization of
his parents when he was five years old. He denied any acts or conduct which
would forfeit his American citizenship.
The eight men had been trained in a special school for sabotage near
Berlin to effect the destruction of factories, power plants, railway and communication systems, bridges, and other key war facilities. They were trained
to use secret writing in order to communicate with Germany and with each
54
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other. They had instructions from an officer of the German High Command
to destroy war industries and facilities in this country. They, or in some
cases their families in Germany, were to be paid a salary for their services.
The F.B.I. recovered in all about $175,000 from the two groups-American
currency which was to be used for expenses and for bribes. They stated that
they had been ordered to wear their German uniforms when landing.
On June 27, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover announced the arrest in New York and
Chicago of the eight men, and their detention by the F.B.I. This was, the
first news of the affair.
On July 2, President Roosevelt issued two proclamations. The first denied
to enemies who enter the United States to commit sabotage, espionage, or
other hostile acts, any right of access to the courts of the United States, and
directed them to be tried by military tribunals in accordance with the law
of war. 1 The second created a Military Commission of eight Army officers,
headed by Major General Frank R. McCoy, to try the eight saboteurs (mentioned by name), ordered the Attorney General and the Judge Advocate
General to conduct the prosecution, and designated Colonel Cassius M.
Dowell and Colonel Kenneth Royall as defense counsel. The Commission was
authorized to make its own rules, to receive evidence which vould have
"probative value to a reasonable man," to convict or sentence by a two-thirds
2
vote, and to transmit its findings to the President for final action.
'The

essential part of the proclamation reads:
"Whereas the safety of the United States demands that all enemies who have entered upon the territory of the United States as part of an invasion or predatory incursion, or who have entered in order to commit sabotage, espionage or other hostile or
warlike acts, should be promptly tried in accordance with the law of war;
"Now, therefore, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America
and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, by virtue of the
authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, do
hereby proclaim that all persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation
at war with the United States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of
any such nation, and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States
or any territory or possession thereof, through coastal or boundary defenses, and are
charged with committing or attempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage,
hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of
war, and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals; and that such persons shall not be
privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to
have any such remedy or proceeding sought on their behalf, in the courts of the United
States, or of its states, territories, and possessions, except under such regulations as
the Attorney General, with the approval of the Secretary of War, may from time to
time
prescribe."
2
"The Commission shall have power to and shall, as occasion requires, make such
rules for the conduct of the proceedings, consistent with tfie powers of military commissions under the Articles of WVar, as it shall deem necessary for a full and fair trial
of the matters before it. Such evidence shall be admitted as would, in the opinion of the
President of the Commission, have probative value to a reasonable man. The concurrence
of at least two-thirds of the members of the Commission present shall be necessary for
a conviction or sentence. The record of the trial, including any judgment or sentence,
shall be transmitted directly to me for my action thereon."--Franklin D. Roosevelt.
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The prisoners were turned over to the military authorities by the Attorney
General and, on July 3, the Government brought four charges against them.
The first was a broad charge of violating the law of war by passing through
our lines in civilian dress in order to commit sabotage, espionage, and other
hostile acts ;3 there were two charges of attempted "spying", and "relieving,
corresponding with or aiding the enemy" under Articles of War 81 and 82 ;4
and a final charge of conspiracy to do all these things.
Trial before the Military Commission began on July 8 in the Department
of Justice Building in Washington behind an almost impenetrable veil of
secrecy. The daily "communiques" finally and reluctantly released 'to the
press by General McCoy were sterile of any information beyond the terse
statements that the Commission met, examined witnesses, and adjourned.
The entire record of the trial, containing as it does important military information, has been impounded for the duration of the war. At the outset
of the trial defense counsel challenged the constitutionality of the President's
Proclamation and the jurisdiction of the Military Commission, and stated
that they waived no constitutional rights of the accused by proceeding. All
of the defendants and numerous witnesses testified. Dasch and Burger aided
the govern ment, the former to such an extent that special counsel was appointed to look after his interests. The trial proceeded until July 27, when
the defense rested its case.
The country was startled on July 27 by an announcement that the Supreme
Court of the United States would convene in special session on July 29 to
allow the submission of petitions for writs of habeas corpus in behalf of the
prisoners. The ensuing proceedings proved to be as confusing on the procedural side as they were dramatic from every other point of view. The
aThe charge grounded on the law of war-read as follows:
"Specifications 1. In that, during the month of June 1942, Edward John Kerling
(and others) being enemies of the United States and acting for and on behalf of the
German Reich, a belligerent enemy nation, secretly and covertly passed, in civilian dress,
contrary to the law of war, through the military and naval lines and defenses of the
United States, along the Atlantic Coast, and went behind such lines and defenses in
civilian dress within zones of military operations and elsewhere, for the purpose of committing acts of sabotage, espionage, and other hostile acts, and, in particular, to destroy
certain war industries, war utilities, and war materials within the United States.
"Specification 2. In that, during the month of June 1942, Edward John Kerling (and
others), being enemies of the United States and acting for and on behalf of the German

Reich, a belligerent enemy nation, appeared, contrary to the law of war, behind the

military and naval defenses and lines of the United States, within the zones of military
operations and elsewhere, for the purpose of committing or attempting to commit sabotage, espionage, and other hostile acts, without being in the uniform of the armed forces
of the German Reich, and planned and attempted to destroy and sabotage war industries,
war utilities, and war materials within the United States, and assembled together within
the United States explosives, money, and other supplies in order to accomplish said
purposes."
441 STAT. 804, 10 U. S. C. 1553-4 (1920).
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day before the Supreme Court convened (July 28) defense counsel asked the
District Court for the District of Columbia for leave to file petitions for
habeas corpus in that court. These applications were denied that evening.
When the Supreme Court met on July 29, two applications were made to it:
first, for permission to file a petition for habeas corpus in the Supreme
Court; second, for permission to file a petition for certiorari to review the
adverse order of the District Court of the preceding day. The first application called for an exercise of the original jurisdiction of the Court. The
second application called for direct review on certiorari of the District Court's
order, thereby by-passing the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. Lawyers and justices alike seemed worried about the Court's
jurisdiction to proceed in either of these two ways. Anxiety with regard to
the Court's power to issue habeas corpus as an exercise of original jurisdiction seems well grounded. It is true that the Judiciary Act of 1789 had
given the Supreme Court power to issue habeas corpus, 5 and the present
Judicial Code explicitly authorizes it.6 But the Court has held repeatedly
that it may issue habeas corpus only in the cases in which it otherwise has
original jurisdiction (cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, or
consuls, and those in which a state is a party), or as a means of reviewing
through its appellate jurisdiction the decision of an inferior officer or court.7
Review by the Supreme Court of what the Military Commission was doing
was rather clearly not an exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction. The
Court finally allowed argument to proceed on the constitutional issues raised
by the petition for habeas corpus, while defense counsel hurried to plug any
gaps in the Court's jurisdiction by perfecting an appeal from the District
Court to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District, and filing with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari to that court before judgment. This
was actually accomplished only a few minutes before the Court met on July 31
to announce its decision. By stipulation of counsel, the record, briefs, and
arguments in the habeas corpus proceedings were treated as the record, briefs,
and arguments upon the writ of certiorari. At the very last minute the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District before that court had rendered judgment, 8 decided on the merits
5

Act of Sept. 24, 1798, Sec. 14. 1

STAT.

73.

GThe present Judicial Code provides: "The Supreme Court and the district courts

shall
have power to issue writs of habeas corpus." 28 U. S. C. 451 (1940).
7

Ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet. 568, 8 L. ed. 786 (U. S. 1833) ; Ex parte Barry, 2 How.
65, 11 L. ed. 181 (U. S. 1844); Ex parte Hung Hang, 108 U. S. 552, 2 Sup. Ct. 863

(1883).

SThis procedure is authorized by the Judicial Code. 43

347a (1940).

STAT.

938 (1925), 28 U. S. C.
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that the order of the District Court denying permission to petition for habeas
corpus be affirmed, and denied the petitioners application for leave to file
petitions for habeas corpus in the Supreme Court. Thus the Court's jurisdiction caught up with the Court just at the finish line.
The proceedings in the Supreme Court occupied two days. Mr. Justice
Murphy, on temporary leave in the Army, did not sit. Major Lauson H.
Stone, the son of Chief Justice Stone, under orders, had assisted defense
counsel in the presentation of the case before the Military Commission. He
was not connected with the proceeding before the Supreme Court, however,
and counsel for both sides urged the Chief Justice not to disqualify himself
on this account. The case involved only seven of the eight prisoners. Dasch,
who had substantially aided the prosecution, did not join in the petition for
habeas corpus. On July 31 the Court handed down, through the Chief Justice, a brief per curiam opinion. It stated in a few sentences that the accused
were being tried on charges which the President could validly order tried
before a military commission, that the military commission was lawfully
constituted, and that no cause had been shown for discharge by habeas corpus.
The orders of the District Court were affirmed, and motions for leave to file
petitions for habeas corpus were denied. The Chief Justice stated that a full
opinion would be prepared "which necessarily will require a considerable
period of time for its preparation and which, when prepared, will be filed with
the Clerk." This opinion was filed on October 29, 1942, under the title
Ex parte Quirin et al.9 As soon as the Court had handed down its decision
on July 31, the Military Commission resumed its sessions. On August 3, it
sent its verdict, together with the complete record, to the President. On
August 8, the President announced that six of the prisoners had been electrocuted, one, Burger, sentenced to life imprisonment, and one, Dasch, sentenced to thirty years.
The Supreme Court's problem was not complicated by any dispute over
the facts. The facts set out above were stipulated by the Government and
defense counsel. The prisoners did not deny them, but claimed that they
had done these things without unlawful or hostile intent solely as a means
of escaping from Germany. They emphasized that they had committed no
unlawful overt acts and had perfected no plans. The truth or falsity of these
statements obviously had nothing to do with the question of which authority,
military or civil, was to try the prisoners. There were, in shorf, no disputed
"jurisdictional" facts.
The twenty-two page opinion written by Chief justice Stone established
three main points, thereby rejecting the three major contentions made on
9Decided October 29, 1942.
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behalf of the petitioners. 10 The first point established was that the Military
Commission had jurisdiction to try the charges against the petitioners. The
supporting argument fell into three divisions. First, the President had
power to establish the Commission. The Constitution grants war powers. It
authorizes Congress to declare war and gives to the President, both as chief
executive and as Commander-in-Chief, full authority to wage the war which
Congress declares and to execute all laws passed for the conduct of the
armed forces. By the Articles of War, Congress has explicitly provided for
trial by military commissions of offenses against the law of war not customarily tried by courts martial." The law of war has been recognized and
applied by American Courts from the beginning.'12 The President has invoked
the law of war as Commander-in-Chief. "By his order creating the present
Commission he has undertaken to exercise the authority conferred upon him
by Congress, and also such authority as the Constitution itself gives the
Commander-in-Chief, to direct the performance of those functions which may
constitutionally be performed by the military arm of the nation in time of
war." But it is unnecessary to decide "to what extent the President as
Commander-in-Chief has constitutional power to create military commissions
without the support of Congressional legislation" since Congress has clearly
authorized the trial of offenses against the law of war before such commissions. Second, the offenses charged against the prisoners are offenses against
the law of war. Offenses against the law of war do not have to be embodied
in the form of explicit statutes any more than does the crime of piracy,
which is nowhere specifically defined. 18 Congress had its choice either of
crystallizing "in permanent form and in minute detail: every offense against
the law of war" or of adopting the system of common law of war applied over
many years by military tribunals. It chose the latter course. The. law of
war has always distinguished between armed forces and peaceful populations of belligerent nations and between lawful and unlawful combatants.
Lawful combatants are liable to capture and detention as prisoners of war.
'0 The Court was aided by briefs from both sides, which, in view of the speed of the
whole proceeding, were extraordinarily comprehensive and able. Readers of the QuR-

will note with interest that Professor George T. Washington and Dean Robert
S. Stevens of the Cornell Law Faculty were both on the Government's brief.
lArticles of War 12, 15, 38, 46, 81, 82. These are found in 41 STAT. 789, 790, 794,
796,2 804 (1920), 10 U. S. C. 1483, 1486, 1509, 1517, 1553, 1554 (1940).
1 The Court here cites sixteen cases ranging from Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dall. 133, 1
L. ed. 540 (U. S. 1795), to Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U. S. 297, 29 Sup.
Ct. 385 (1909).
1335 STAT. 1145 (1909), 18 U. S. C. 481 (1940) provides: "Whoever, on the high
seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards
brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life." The validity
of an almost identical earlier statute was upheld in an opinion by Mr. Justice Story
in United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153, 5 L. ed. 57 (U. S. 1820).
TFRLY
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Unlawful combatants are also thus' liable, but in addition are subject "to
trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful." These distinctions were recognized before the adoption
of the Constitution and during the Mexican and Civil Wars. By the longestablished practice of this government "those who during time of war pass
surreptitiously from enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms
upon entry, for the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life
or property, have the status of unlawful combatants punishable as such by
military commission." This is precisely what these defendants are charged
with doing in the first charge brought against them. It is not necessary that
the hostile acts alleged should be committed against our armed forces.
"Modern warfare is directed at the destruction of enemy war supplies and
the implements for their production and transportation quite as much as at
the armed forces." Nor does it make any difference that the prisoners did
nothing. "The offense w~s complete when with that purpose they enteredor, having so entered, they remained upon-our territory in time of war without uniform or other appropriate means of identification." Third, the Commission had jurisdiction regardless of the alleged citizenship of any of the
petitioners. Offenses against the law of war are not the exclusive crimes
of aliens. They may be committed by an American citizen. Defense counsel had presented a special argument on behalf of one of the defendants,
Haupt, based on his American citizenship which he had acquired at the age
of five through the naturalization of his father. The fact of citizenship is held
to be entirely irrelevant. The Court declared that a citizen could, by his
acts, become an enemy belligerent and that "citizenship does not relieve him
from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation
of the law of war."
The second main point established by the Court is that the constitutional
guarantees of grand jury indictment and jury trial do not apply to the petitioners' trial before a military tribunal for offenses against the law of war.
The argument here is largely historical. Jury trial was no part of the procedure of a military tribunal at common law. The clauses of the Constitution requiring jury trial were not intended to make it such. These clauses
were designed to protect trial by jury as then known and applied, not to
apply it to new situations. The Court has steadily followed this principle as
is shown in the cases holding jury trial not necessary in the trial of petty
offenses 14 and criminal contempts 15 because the common law had not required
14 Schick v. United States, 195 U. S. 65, 24 Sup. Ct. 826 (1904) ; District of Columbia
300 U. S. 617, 57 Sup. Ct. 14 (1937).
v. Clawans,
15Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 302-4, 9 Sup. Ct. 77 (1888); Savin, Petitioner,
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it in these cases. The Fifth Amendment, which guarantees grand jury indictment, expressly excepts from its operation "cases arising in the land or
naval forces," 1 6 and these cases are held to be excepted by implication from
the jury trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment. Defense counsel had
argued that the specific exception from the grand jury and jury trial requirements of all "cases arising in the land and naval forces" meant that there
could be no other exception. This view, said Chief' Justice Stone, "misconceives both the scope of the Amendment and the purpose of the exception."
"Cases arising in the land and naval forces" are cases involving offenses of
whatever nature committed by our soldiers and sailors, offenses which, if
committed by civilians, would in most cases be triable by jury. These cases
are tried by courts martial not because of the nature of the offenses but because of the membership in our armed forces of those who commit them.
The exception has no bearing on the applicability or inapplicability of the jury
trial requirement to offenses against the law of war. "We cannot say that
Congress in preparing the Fifth and Sixth Amendments intended to extend
trial by jury to the cases of alien or citizen offenders against the law of war
otherwise triable by military commission, while withholding it from members
of our own armed forces charged with infractions of the Articles of War
punishable by death."
The Court then turned to the Milligan case 17 and disposed of it in thirty
lines. The Milligan case had been the great bulwark of the defense. Attorney General Biddle in oral argument assured the Court "you could decide
this case without touching a hair of the Milligan case, but if it were not for
the Milligan case, this case would not be here."' 8 He was undoubtedly, correct. For seventy-five years the Milligan case has been cited as protecting
the right of the civilian to a jury trial in time of war except in the immediate
theater of military action. It will be recalled that during the Civil War,
Lambdin P. Milligan was charged with seditious and treasonable activities
in Indiana where he lived, was arrested by the Union military authorities,
131 U. S. 267, 277, 9 Sup. Ct. 699 (1889) ; It re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 594-96, 15 Sup.
Ct. 900 (1895); United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563, 572, 27 Sup. Ct. 165 (1906);
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 440, 52 Sup. Ct. 252 (1932) ; Nye v. United
313 U. S. 33, 48, 61 Sup. Ct. 810 (1941).
States,
' 6 The Amendment reads: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on the presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of war or public danger; . ..

."

'VEx parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. ed. 281 (1866). Those wishing to make a close
study of this interesting case should consult Ex PARTE IN THE MATTER OF LAMBDIN P.
MILLIGAN, edited by Samuel IKaus, New York, 1929. This contains the record, arguments, and opinions in the case, the proceedings of the military commission which tried
and a valuable sixty-page introduction by the editor.
Milligan,
1
SThe New York Times, July 31, 1942, p. 4, col. 2.
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and was tried for his crime by a military commission set up for the purpose
by President Lincoln without the sanction of any statute. He was convicted
and sentenced to be hanged. He took his case to the Supreme Court in an
attack upon the constitutionality of his trial. In 1866 the Supreme Court
held that he had been unconstitutionally denied a jury trial in a civil court
and set him free. Nine justices held that his trial before the military commission was invalid since the Congressional legislation then in force forbade
a military trial of a civilian resident. "That body [Congress]" said Chief
Justice Chase, "did not see fit to authorize trials by military commission, but
by the strongest implication prohibited them." Five members of the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Davis, then went on to state that Congress
itself could not validly authorize the trial of civilian residents by military
commissions except in the actual areas in which existing military operations
had resulted in the closing of the civil courts. Four justices disagreed with
this sweeping rule. The Government's position was that the doctrine of the
Milligan case, properly construed, is inapplicable to the Nazi saboteurs, but
that if it should be held applicable then it ought to be overruled.
The Court followed the first and easier course and declared that "The
Court's opinion in the Milligan case is inapplicable to the case presented by
'the present record." It mentioned the fact that Milligan was for twenty
years a citizen and resident of Indiana, that he had never been a resident
of a rebellious state, and he was not an enemy belligerent and had not had
contact with armed enemy forces, and was for these reasons not subject to
the law of war. It concluded "We construe the Court's statement as to the
inapplicability of the law of war to Milligan's case as having particular reference to the facts before it." Having satisfied itself that the Government's first
charge against the petitioners, alleging offenses against the law of war
was "not merely colorable or without foundation," the Court declined to
examine the other three charges.
The third point established by the Court was that the President's order
setting up the Military Commission and determining its procedure was valid,
and that the Commission itself had followed lawful procedure. The brief of
defense counsel on this point had been long and detailed and had charged
that the President's order violated specific Articles of War enacted by Congress, and that the Commission's procedure also had violated statutory
requirements. The Court did not consider the issues involved on their merits.
Chief Justice Stone stated that the Court was unanimous in holding that
no valid claim for habeas corpus could be based on the provisions of the
Articles of War, but that the Court was divided on the grounds for this
decision. Four justices "are of opinion that Congress did not intend the
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Articles of War to govern a Presidential military commission convened for
the determination of questions relating to admitted enemy invaders." The
other four justices took the view that "the particular Articles in question,
rightly construed, do not foreclose the procedure prescribed by the President
or shown to have been employed by the Commission." In short, the Articles
of War either did not govern the President in setting up the Commission,
or, if they did govern him, he had not violated them. This concluded the
Court's opinion.
The outcome of the case and the decision of the Supreme Court met with
general approval. There was, however, some criticism of the Court for taking the case at all and for dealing so thoroughly with the constitutional issues
raised. Even some of our liberals explained that while we ought, of course,
to be scrupulous to administer impartial justice according to our traditional
American rule of law, we ought not in the midst of a total war to waste
time, money, and manpower by this ludicrous judicial ritual in the case of
a group of enemy criminals who should have been shot at sunrise without
more to-do. I believe this view fails to take stock of several significant
things about the Court's handling of the case and about the principles embodied in the opinion. These merit brief comment.
In the first place, the prisoners did get through to the ,Supreme Court and
had their questions answered by that tribunal. That, in itself, is an important
fact. The President's Proclamation had specifically denied the prisoners
access to the civil courts. The position of the Attorney General was that
the President could lawfully have ordered the prisoners shot as soon as they
were arrested, that trial before the Military Commission was given as an act
of grace and not of necessity, and that as belligerents the prisoners had no
right of access to any court.' 9 But when the special session of the Supreme
Court opened, Chief Justice Stone asked Mr. Biddle: "Does the Attorney
General challenge the jurisdiction of the Court?" and Mr. Biddle replied:
"I do not." 20 Chief Justice Stone touched on this general point in his opinion.
He referred to the Government's contention that because they were enemy
aliens and because of the President's Proclamation, no court could give the
prisoners a hearing, and said: "But there is certainly nothing in the Proclamation to preclude access to the courts for determining its applicability to
the particular case. And neither the Proclamation nor the fact that they
are enemy aliens forecloses consideration by the courts of petitioners' contentions that the Constitution and laws of the United States constitutionally
1
9"These petitioners, as enemies who crossed our borders after the declaration of war,
have no legal right to ask this Court, by habeas corpus or otherwise, to inquire into
the20 lawfulness of their detention." Brief for Respondent, p. 13.
The New York Times, July 30, 1942, p. 4, col. 1.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 28

enacted forbid their trial by military commission." There is little in the
history of this case to encourage unlawful belligerents arrested in this country
to seek access to the civil courts. But what the Court did and held appears
to boil down to this: the Court will look at the question of the detention
of anybody under circumstances so unusual or suspicious as to raise the
question whether he may possibly be entitled to a civil trial. It is an important protection to civil liberty that the Court, in its discretion, is willing to
take this initial look. It may decide to look no further, or, as in this case,
it may consider the prisoner's contention on its merits. It is inportant and
gratifying that the Court actually took the case.
It is interesting, in the second place, that the facts essential to the jurisdiction of the Military Commission; according to the view announced by the
Court, were not in dispute. There was no controversy over what the prisoners actually had done. The case, therefore, leaves more or less open the
important question of how to proceed should these "jurisdictional" facts
be disputed. Let us assume the arrest in the interior of the country of citizens or aliens charged by military authorities with acts of sabotage or other
hostile acts, and the holding of these persons for trial by military commission
in the face of their denial of misconduct and of confusing evidence as to what
actually occurred. Here the jurisdiction of the Military Commission would
appear to depend upon the truth of hotly disputed charges. Is the commission
to be allowed to assume the existence of the facts necessary to its own jurisdiction? If so, there would appear to exist the possibility of the arbitrary
denial of constitutional rights. While this problem did not arise in the case
of the Nazi saboteurs, the Court's opinion contains one phrase which indicates that Chief justice Stone was aware of the-sticky problem which he was
avoiding. In declaring that the Government's first charge against the prisoners stated an offense against the law of war, he went on to say, "and the
admitted facts affirmatively show that the charge is not merely colorable or
without, foundation." This may mean that in a case where jurisdiction is
claimed for a military commission on the basis of disputed jurisdictional
facts, the Court will insist that the Government produce something substantial and convincing to support its allegations. It would not be permitted to
assert military jurisdiction groundlessly. This is a desirable outside restraint
which might prevent the graver abuses resulting from possible arbitrary and
irresponsible action by the military authorities.
A third point of interest was the Court's rather summary ruling that the
citizenship of the defendant Haupt was irrelevant to the question of the
jurisdiction of the Military Commission to try him. He was charged with
violating the law of war, and that offense may be committed by a citizen
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as well as by an enemy alien. Nor is his claim of the right of jury trial
strengthened by his citizenship. The civil rights guaranteed in the First
Ten Amendments and in other clauses of the Constitution are not reserved
for American citizens alone but extend to all persons subject to the jurisdiction of our government.
Fourth, the Court's decision, so far from impeding the management of the
war, dealt generously with the military authorities. The law of war was
recognized and broadly interpreted. The Court showed no interest in the
procedural technicalities embodied in the Articles of War enacted by Congress and alleged by defense counsel to govern the President in setting up
the Military Commission. Half the Court thought the technical requirements were irrelevant, the other half thought they had not been violated anyway. There was no disposition to discuss them. Finally the ghost of Lambdin
P. Milligan was laid. The Court held in substance that the Milligan case is
sui generis. It arose out of facts not duplicated in the present case and not
likely ever to be duplicated. Its doctrine is confined to those facts and has
no relevance to the situation of prisoners whose status has nothing in common
with the situation in which Milligan was placed. The case was not overruled;
it was merely denied any general applicability outside its own unique facts.
What the case boils down to is this: The Supreme Court stopped the
military authorities and required them, as it were, to show their credentials.
When this had been done to the Court's satisfaction they were allowed to
proceed. This does not mean that in every case in which military justice
is being administered the Court will insist on making a similar scrutiny. But
it is a wholesome and desirable safeguard to civil liberty in time of war to
have the Supreme Court reserve, and occasionally act'upon, the right thus
to examine the authority of the military in those cases in which in the Court's
judgment the public interest and welfare will be served by so doing.

